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THE MEANING OF "PART OF THE BASIS OF THE
BARGAIN"
Let us use with care those living messengers called words. *
INTRODUCTION
Section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
outlines the law of express warranty for the sale of goods.'
An express warranty is created under this section when a
seller's (or manufacturer's) representation in the form of
an affirmation of fact, a promise, a description, a sample, or a
model becomes "part of the basis of the bargain." 3 The inten-
tion of the seller to warrant the goods is not necessary to im-
pose an express warranty,4 only a representation that becomes
"part of the basis of the bargain."'
The phrase, "part of the basis of the bargain," is unique
to section 2-313 and new to the law of warranty. Before the
1979 by Kevin McIvers.
William Q. Judge, 19th Century lawyer and philosopher.
1. "Goods" are defined as:
all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable
at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money
in which the price is to be paid. ... Goods" also includes the unborn
young of animals and growing crops and other identified things attached
to realty.
U.C.C. § 2-105(1).
2. U.C.C. § 2-318 defines the liability of a seller to a remote user who is not in
privity of contract with that seller. California has not adopted this provision, however,
and relies wholly upon case law. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
331 n.16 (1972).
3. The following is the full text of U.C.C. § 2-313:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall con-
form to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods
shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the
seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have
a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the
value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's
opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
4. U.C.C. § 2-313(2).
5. Id. § 2-313, Official Comment 3.
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U.C.C. was adopted, section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act
(hereafter Sales Act) governed the law of express warranty
for the sale of goods. That section stated that an express war-
ranty was created if the affirmation of fact or promise had a
"natural tendency . . .to induce the buyer to purchase the
goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon."6
When the Sales Act was rewritten in the form of the U.C.C.,
7
the reference to reliance in express warranty was omitted, indi-
cating the intention of the drafters to alter the old standard.
Reliance has been replaced with the concept "part of the basis
of the bargain."
The exact meaning of the phrase "part of the basis of the
bargain" has not been agreed upon. This confusion is not sur-
prising since neither the text of section 2-313 nor the Official
Code Comments (hereafter Comments), which accompany
the text, offer a clear definition.'
The author's purpose in this comment is to define the
phrase "part of the basis of the bargain." Initially, the three
general interpretations of section 2-313 most frequently sug-
gested by commentators are considered. Second, U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-313 is applied to four factual settings. These four settings
are: (1) the buyer is unaware, at the moment of purchase, of
an existing representation; (2) the representation is made to a
buyer after the sale; (3) the buyer knows, at the moment of
sale, of an existing representation; and (4) the buyer knows
that an existing representation is false. Third, a comparison is
made between section 2-313 and other theories of product lia-
bility. Finally, a definition of "part of the basis of the bargain"
is offered.
SUGGESTED INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 2-313
In Hauter v. Zogarts,' the California Supreme Court ad-
6. UNIFORM SALEs ACr § 12 (1906 version).
7. See U.C.C. § 2-313, Official Comments, Changes.
The Comments were written to aid in the interpretation of the text. This purpose
was explained by the drafters in the 1954 version of the U.C.C., but was omitted from
later drafts:
The Comments of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Law Institute may be consulted in the
construction and application of this Act, but if text and comment con-
flict, text controls.
U.C.C. § 1-102(3)(f) (1954 version).
8. The Comments to section 2-313 discuss application of the section to some
specific factual settings but leave many questions unanswered. A comprehensive defi-
nition of "part of the basis of the bargain" is not attempted.
9. 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1975).
[Vol. 19
BASIS OF THE BARGAIN
dressed the interpretation of section 2-313 for the first time.
The court recognized the three interpretations that are usually
offered: (1) the plaintiff must affirmatively prove reliance, as
under the Sales Act;"0 (2) reliance is presumed, and the defen-
dant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff did not rely;
(3) no reliance need be shown or presumed to establish the
existence of an express warranty." Although the facts of this
case did not require the court to state its position,'2 the court
rejected the first interpretation requiring proof of reliance.'3 No
opinion as to the other two positions was given. A careful read-
ing of the Comments supports the court's rejection of strict
reliance and sheds some light on the other two interpretations.
Strict Reliance
The reasons for rejecting the interpretation requiring af-
firmative proof of reliance are clear. The word "reliance" does
not appear in the text in section 2-313. This absence is conspic-
uous, given the requirement of reliance in the Sales Act 4 and
in the two other product liability theories based upon a seller's
representation, strict liability for innocent misrepresentation,' 5
and negligent misrepresentation.0 This time-honored concept
would not have been replaced with new and difficult language
unless some change had been intended. The U.C.C. drafters
included a requirement of reliance in section 2-315, implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,"7 making it clear
that they realized a distinction between the traditional reliance
test and the words "part of the basis of the bargain." Further-
more, Comment 3 explicitly states: "[N]o particular reliance
on such statements [affirmations of fact] need be shown in
order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement."' 8 No
other reference to reliance is made in the comments.
10. UNIFORM SALES Acr § 12 (1906 version).
11. 14 Cal. 3d at 115-16, 534 P.2d at 383-84, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 687-88.
12. The plaintiff, Fred Hauter, clearly relied upon the seller's representation and
therefore could meet his burden of proof regardless of which test was applied. Id. at
116-17, 534 P.2d at 384, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
13. Id. at 115, 534 P.2d at 383-84, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 687-88.
14. UNIFORM SALES AT § 12 (1906 version).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402-B (1965).
16. Id. § 311.
17. U.C.C. § 2-315.
18. Id. § 2-313, Official Comment 3.
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Presumption of Reliance
The position that the defendant must rebut a presumption
of reliance is based upon two statements in the Comments.
Comment 3 states: "[A]ny fact which is to take . . . affirma-
tions, once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirma-
tive proof."' 9 Comment 6 states: "[T]he presumption is that
any sample or model just as any affirmation of fact is intended
to become a basis of the bargain.""0 These statements have
been interpreted to mean that a presumption of reliance is
created which may be overcome by affirmative proof of non-
reliance.2'
The Comments do not support this position, however, and
nowhere in the text of section 2-313 is it stated that a presump-
tion of reliance is created. The presumption created is not that
reliance existed, but rather that a representation became part
of the basis of the bargain-a different concept. "2 If the drafters
had intended that a presumption of reliance be created by
section 2-313, it would have been a simple matter to explain
the presumption in the text and Comments using the word
"reliance." The fact that the word was avoided is strong evi-
dence that affirmative proof of reliance by a plaintiff is not
necessary. It is equally strong evidence that a presumption of
reliance has not been created.
No Reliance
Although the Comments do not unequivocally state that
the Sales Act standard of reliance was purposefully abandoned,
it must be assumed from the lack of support in the text and
Comments for any theory under section 2-313 utilizing reliance
that "part of the basis of the bargain" does not express the
same concept as reliance.
If it does not include reliance, "part of the basis of the
bargain" must be defined in other terms. Considering the ap-
plication of section 2-313 to particular factual situations will be
helpful in such a definition.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 2-313, Official Comment 6.
21. Ezer, The Impact of the U. C. C. on the California Law of Sales Warranties,
8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 281, 285 n.30: "The Code's implicit premise is that the buyer's
reliance is prima facie established from the fact that he made the purchase." See also
J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 279 (1972).
22. Notice the choice of words in Comment 6. "Reliance" is not used. U.C.C. §
2-313, Official Comment 6.
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APPLICATION OF SECTION 2-313
In spite of the absence of any reference to reliance in sec-
tion 2-313, courts and writers have usually insisted upon some
requirement of reliance. 3 In General Supply & Equipment Co.,
Inc. v. Phillips,"4 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals outlined that
state's requirements under section 2-313: a plaintiff must show
(1) the existence of an affirmation or promise relating to goods,
(2) the affirmation or promise became part of the basis of the
bargain, and (3) the injured party relied upon the seller's repre-
sentation in purchasing the goods.2 5 In Eddington v. Dick,2" the
interpretation of a New York court was virtually identical in
form to the Sales Act standard. It required (1) an affirmation
of fact or promise by the seller, (2) the natural tendency of
which is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and (3) that
the buyer purchases the goods in reliance thereon.27
These and other cases show that courts have fallen back
on the familiar standard of reliance for lack of a clear definition
of "part of the basis of the bargain." However, since reliance
is not called for in the text or Comments of section 2-313, its
application should not include reliance. Instead, a new stan-
dard must be developed. By applying section 2-313, with the
guidance of the Comments, to several factual settings, the na-
ture of such a new standard can be demonstrated.
Buyer is Unaware of an Existing Representation
In this situation, the buyer, at the moment of purchase, is
unaware of an existing express warranty created by a seller for
the benefit of the class of persons of which the buyer is a mem-
ber (prospective buyers). Here, the ability of section 2-313 to
23. See generally W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE U.C.C. 58
(1964); Kock, Seller's Responsibility for His Goods Under the U.C. C., 41 N.D. L. REV.
24, 26 (1964); Lauer, Sales Warranties Under the U.C.C., 30 Mo. L. REv. 259, 265-66
(1965); Shanker & Abel, Consumer Protection Under Article 2 of the U.C.C., 29 OHIO
L.J. 689, 690 (1968); Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967);
Hrosik v. J. Keina Builders, 37 Ill. App. 3d 352, 345 N.E.2d 514 (1976); Stamm v.
Wilder Travel Trailers, 44 Ill. App. 3d 530, 358 N.E.2d 382 (1976); Ill. General Supply
& Equipment Co. v. Phillips, 490 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972); Eddington
v. Dick, 87 Misc. 2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1976).
24. 490 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972).
25. It is interesting to note that this court required both that the buyer rely and
that the representation become part of the basis of the bargain, indicating an implicit
recognition that the two are different concepts. No attempt was made to define the
nature of this difference, however. Id. at 917.
26. 87 Misc. 2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1976).
27. Id. at 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 181.
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reach beyond the scope of the Sales Act can be clearly seen.
An express warranty could not have existed under the
Sales Act when a buyer was unaware of the representation,
because a person cannot rely upon something completely out-
side of his or her knowledge and experience. 8 Likewise, if af-
firmative proof of reliance is required by U.C.C. section 2-313,
an express warranty cannot exist under the U.C.C. without the
buyer's knowledge of the representation before purchase."
Even creating a presumption of reliance would not change the
outcome of a case in which the buyer is unaware of the repre-
sentation, because such a presumption could easily be over-
come by pointing to the plaintiff's lack of awareness of the
representation." An express warranty could not exist without
the buyer's advance knowledge of the representation. However,
a careful look at section 2-313 reveals the intention of the draf-
ters to permit the plaintiff the possibility of recovery under an
express warranty without prior knowledge of the representa-
tion.
In section 2-313(1)(a), which refers to representations
made in the form of affirmations of fact or promises, the U.C.C.
explicitly requires that the representation which relates to the
goods be made "by the seller to the buyer." 3' In subsections
(1)(b) and (1)(c), which refer to representations made in the
form of descriptions, samples, or models, the requirement that
a representation be made "to the buyer" is conspicuously miss-
ing.32
Since the language is so obviously different, the drafters
must have intended to leave open the possibility that an ex-
press warranty of description, sample, or model could inure to
the benefit of a particular buyer to whom it had not been per-
sonally communicated. This is very significant because there
are few situations in which a seller's words, containing an affir-
mation of fact or promise relating to a product, do not also
describe the product to some degree. 3  For example, to state
28. See generally UNIFORM SALES ACT § 12 (1906 version).
29. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 277 (1972). "At
minimum a plaintiff . . . should have to testify that he (or his agent) knew of and
relied upon the advertisement in making the purchase." Id. at 280.
30. Under § 2-313, affirmative proof may overcome a presumption that a war-
ranty is "part of the basis of the bargain." Whether the presumption is overcome is
normally a question of fact. U.C.C. § 2-313, Official Comment 3.
31. U.C.C. § 2-313(1).
32. Id.
33. Comment 3 indicates that the drafters intended this broad interpretation of
warranties of description: "In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller
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that tests taken of a product "show no deterioration in five
years of normal use" is to affirm a fact, but it is also to de-
scribe the quality of the product.34 Thus, a buyer may often be
protected by an express warranty of description, sample, or
model of which that person was unaware of at the time of
purchase because section 2-313 does not require communica-
tion from the seller "to the buyer" in such cases.
35
The inclusion of the word "basis" in the text of section 2-
313 is further evidence that reliance is not required and that
an express warranty is not limited to the representations com-
municated to the buyer at or before the moment of sale. The
key phrase could have been more concisely worded, "part of the
bargain," "part of the sales agreement," or "part of the con-
tract of sale." The words "bargain," "agreement," or
"contract" by themselves convey clearly and simply the idea
that communication of the representation between the seller
and the buyer must occur, if the representation is to be a bind-
ing part of the sales contract. Without modification, these
words imply mutual knowledge, understanding, and consent.
The word "basis" adds nothing to such an interpretation. To
one who is thinking in terms of standard contract law or in
terms of an express warranty based upon the concept of reli-
ance, the word is unnecessary and confusing. "Basis" must be
intended to create a different meaning.
"Basis" is defined as "foundation" and as "something
upon which something else is constructed or established." 3 A
sales agreement or bargain is established upon the basis of a
collection of laws and accepted practices within a particular
marketplace, as well as upon agreements between parties.
These rules and practices within the marketplace make up the
general commercial setting, which is the "foundation" of each
sales agreement-the "basis" of each bargain. Of course, reli-
ance by one party on an agreement or on a promise of another
may be a part of the total setting in which a particular sale is
made, but it does not constitute the entire "basis." Other fac-
about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of these
goods. .. ." U.C.C. § 2-313, Official Comment 3.
34. General Supply & Equipment Co. v. Phillips, 490 S.W.2d at 917-18.
35. This distinction within section 2-313 may indicate an intent to distinguish
between personal communications and generally communicated representations. It is
fair that a personal communication between one seller and one buyer (affirmation of
fact or promise) would not be a sufficient basis to create an express warranty for the
benefit of future buyers who happen to become aware of the content of that personal
communication.
36. WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 93 (8th ed. 1974).
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tors, such as the relevant laws, customs of the trade, market
conditions, and advertising, are always involved. However, the
language of the statute requires only that the representation
form a "part of the basis of the bargain. '37
To be "part of the basis of the bargain," a representation
must constitute some portion ("part") of the particular com-
mercial environment ("basis") in which the sale ("bargain") is
made. Therefore, a representation can either be generally com-
municated in the marketplace of the product, or be communi-
cated to a particular buyer."
Such a reading of section 2-313 is supported by Comment
2: "[T]he warranty sections of this Article are not designed in
any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have
recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales
contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract (italics
added).""9
Thus it would be consistent with section 2-313 for a court
to find an express warranty even though the representation was
not actually an element of the sales negotiation or agreement.
The nature of the interaction between a seller and a buyer in
establishing a contract of sale is immaterial to the question of
whether an express warranty has been created by that seller.
Courts are invited to step creatively beyond the limitations
imposed by the old law of express warranty.
Once the seller's representation has been found to be a
part of the commercial setting in which a particular product is
marketed, the final question to be considered is that of fair-
ness."' If the circumstances are such that it would be fair to
bind a seller to the representation, an express warranty exists.
Fairness is not explicitly defined in the Comments. We know,
however, that buyer reliance is not a factor.
The above analysis is well illustrated in three recent cases.
In Jackson v. Muhlenburg Hospital," the defendant hospital
was sued when a patient contracted hepatitis following blood
transfusions. A label on the container of blood, which neither
37. U.C.C. § 2-313.
38. Examples of representations communicated generally in the marketplace
are: (1) advertisements; (2) information on labels and containers; (3) notices of war-
ranty or guarantee intended to pass with the product at sale.
39. U.C.C. § 2-313, Official Comment 2.
40. "The sole question is whether the language or samples or models are fairly
to be regarded as part of the contract." U.C.C. § 2-313, Official Comment 7 (italics
added).
41. 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
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the plaintiff nor her husband saw, guaranteed the "utmost care
in the selection of donors .. ."I' In sending the case back for
retrial on the issue of the care used in selecting donors, the
court held: "The fact that the patient and her husband proba-
bly never saw the label on the container of blood has not been
overlooked. They are nevertheless entitled to the benefit of the
express warranty."43
Marston v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Company, Inc."
involved the sale and use of an insecticide. The product label
stated that it was recommended for use as a transplant water
treatment for tobacco growing. The plaintiff used the product
for the prescribed purpose with the result that his crop was
badly damaged. Although the plaintiff testified that he did not
read the label until after delivery, the court held that an ex-
press warranty was created for his benefit, reliance not being
an element of a section 2-313 cause of action."
In Winston Industries, Inc. v. Stuyvestant Ins. Co.," the
buyer purchased a new mobile home to be used as a personal
residence. Shortly after purchase, the mobile home was badly
flooded as the result of a disconnected waterline. The flooding
caused extensive and permanent damage to the mobile home.
While it was a business practice of the seller to place a written
warranty in every mobile home sold, no warranty ever reached
the purchaser in this case. In affirming a judgment for the
plaintiff, the court said: "[D]espite the fact that the pur-
chaser did not physically receive a copy of the written ex-
pressed warranty an express warranty was, in fact, in existence
and does inure to the benefit of appellee. '47
The interpretation of section 2-313 employed by the courts
in the Jackson, Marston, and Winston Industries cases is con-
sistent with the public policy considerations which underlie the
U.C.C.11 A seller is encouraged to make only careful and accur-
ate representations and to continue to produce a product which
meets the minimum standard of quality established by the
representation. Comment 4 states that "the whole purpose of
the law of warranty is to determine what it is that the seller
42. Id. at 66.
43. Id.
44. 23 U.C.C. Rptr. 1140 (W.D. Va. 1978).
45. The district court cited Comment 4 as authority: "[N]o particular reliance
need be shown. . . ." Id. at 1142.
46. 55 Ala. App. 525, 317 So. 2d 493 (Civ. App. 1975).
47. Id. at 529, 317 So. 2d 496.
48. See R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 209 (1970).
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has in essence agreed to sell.""9 It is the seller, by the represen-
tation made, who sets the standard of quality to which the
goods must conform, thereby agreeing to sell to the potential
buyer goods of the quality described. By focusing on the con-
tent of the representation rather than on the buyer's reliance,
the policy of encouraging the responsible marketing of high
quality goods is best realized. It is not reasonable to deny a
buyer the protection of an express warranty because the buyer
happened not to read the representation. The California Su-
preme Court noted this view in Hauter, stating: "[I]f a seller
agrees to sell a certain quality of product, he cannot avoid
liability for selling lower grade goods. No longer can he find
solace in the fact that the injured consumer never saw his war-
ranty.50"
Representation Is Made to the Buyer After the Sale
It is not uncommon for a purchaser to receive additional
assurances from a seller after the moment of purchase. Since
the purchase has already been completed, it is not possible that
the buyer purchased in reliance upon the representation.
Under the Sales Act, therefore, no express warranty would
exist.5'
However, an express warranty may be created in this way
because reliance is not an element under the U.C.C. Comment
7 states:
The precise time when the words of description or affirma-
tion are made or samples are shown is not material. The
sole question is whether the language or samples or models
are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract. If language
is used after the closing of the deal (as when the buyer
when taking delivery asks and receives an additional as-
surance), the warranty becomes a modification, and need
not be supported by consideration if it is otherwise reason-
able and in order (§2-209).2
Jones v. A brianill illustrates the proper application of this
principle. In that case, promises made by a seller to a buyer
after the purchase of a mobile home were designed to induce
49. U.C.C. § 2-313, Official Comment 4.
50. Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 116 n.12, 534 P.2d 377, 384 n.12, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 681, 688 n.12 (1975). The court here merely took note of this view without
expressing its position.
51. UNIFORM SALES Acr § 12 (1906 version).
52. U.C.C. § 2-313, Official Comment 7.
53. 350 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
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the buyer to accept delivery of the product with certain defects.
The court held that an express warranty by modification was
created, even though no reliance could have existed on the
facts."
One commentator suggests another rationale for post-sale
representations becoming express warranties without addi-
tional consideration: "A 'bargain' is not something that occurs
at a particular moment in time, and is forever fixed as to its
content; instead, it describes the commercial relationship be-
tween the parties in regard to this product."55 Under this
theory, a post-sale representation could easily be seen as creat-
ing an express warranty. Consideration for the warranty is
found in a buyer's forbearance to return the product for re-
fund." However convincing this rationale might be, it is unnec-
essary because the U.C.C. clearly requires no showing of con-
sideration of any kind to create an express warranty by modifi-
cation."
Some courts refuse to recognize an express warranty when
the representation comes after the sale. In Hrosik v. J. Keim
Builders,58 the court held that a written warranty on a home
delivered after purchase was not an express warranty under
U.C.C. section 2-313 because "reliance [at the time of pur-
chase] is missing."5 Such a ruling is manifestly unfair and
fails to take into account the explicit provision for modification
under section 2-209,10 where reliance is not required.
Post-sale express warranties by modification are another
example of the U.C.C. explicitly abandoning the concept of
reliance in express warranty.
Buyer Knows of an Existing Representation
The most common factual setting in express warranty
cases is that in which the representation is communicated to a
buyer at or before the moment of purchase. This situation oc-
curs frequently in express warranty cases because it is only
with the buyer's advance knowledge of a representation that it
is possible to find reliance, which has often been considered
54. Id. at 645.
55. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 48, at 206.
56. Id. at 207.
57. U.C.C. § 2-209(1).
58. 37 Il. App. 2d 352, 345 N.E.2d 514 (1976).
59. Id. at 354, 345 N.E.2d at 515.
60. U.C.C. § 2-209(1): "An agreement modifying a contract within this Article
needs no consideration to be binding."
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necessary to create a section 2-313 express warranty.
When the representation is communicated to the buyer at
or before purchase, courts usually have no trouble finding reli-
ance and, therefore, an express warranty. Of course, proving
reliance, that is, a dependency existing in a human mind at a
particular moment, is a task more metaphysical than legal.'
It has generally been sufficient to show that "the seller's state-
ments . . .were of a kind which naturally would induce the
buyer to purchase the goods and that he did purchase the
goods." 2 A seller's statement communicated to a buyer which
reflects positively upon a product, and that buyer's eventual
purchase of the product, is all that is needed to establish reli-
ance.
With a buyer's advance knowledge of a representation,
there should also be no difficulty in finding that a representa-
tion has become "part of the basis of the bargain." Writers
have agreed that the test under section 2-313 is satisfied if
reliance is found to exist. 3 That a buyer relies upon a represen-
tation is ample proof that it has become a part of the commer-
cial environment within which the sales contract is made.
Even with no proof of reliance, a buyer may still be pro-
tected by an express warranty if it is "part of the basis of the
bargain," 4 since representations communicated to the general
market in which the product will be sold or to a particular
buyer form part of the foundation of the sale to that buyer.
Nothing else need be shown "to weave them [representations]
into the fabric of the agreement.""6 In Gillette Dairy, Inc. v.
Hydrotex Industries,"6 the court held that the trial court had
properly left it for the jury to determine whether a representa-
tion made before purchase, concerning oil used in the plaintiffs
machinery, had become "part of the basis of the bargain," even
though there was apparently no reliance in the purchase. Reli-
61. See Ezer, The Impact of the U.C.C. on The California Law of Sales
Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 281 (1961). He stresses the role of § 2-313 in de-
emphasizing the "metaphysical buyer's reliance" test. Id. at 285.
62. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 278 (1972). The authors
quote Professor Williston's analysis of the burden of proof under the Uniform Sales
Act, but without reference to reliance. S. WLLISTON, SALES 206 (rev. ed. 1948). See also
Steiner v. Jarrett, 130 Cal. App. 2d 869, 280 P.2d 235 (1954).
63. "If the seller's statements would have met the test of the Uniform Sales Act,
the 'basis of the bargain' test of the Code has been satisfied." R. NORDSTROM, supra
note 48, at 205.
64. U.C.C. § 2-313, Official Comment 3.
65. Id.
66. 440 F.2d 969 (1970).
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ance was not seen as being synonymous with "part of the basis
of the bargain. '
'1 7
The only time a representation might not constitute an
express warranty at the time of purchase is when it is merely a
statement of the value of the goods or of the seller's opinion
regarding the goods, 8 or when the particular representation is
properly disclaimed by the seller."9 Even when the representa-
tion is one of value or opinion, it is a question of fact whether
it has become a "part of the basis of the bargain. 70
Buyer is Aware that a Warranty is False
When a buyer becomes aware before purchase that a prod-
uct does not conform to a seller's representation, it is generally
held that the buyer cannot later assert a claim based upon that
representation. 71 This point of view is based upon the idea that
some quantum of reliance is required by U.C.C. section 2-313,
and that a buyer would not rely upon information known to be
inaccurate.72 Since reliance is not an element of section 2-313,11
this reliance analysis is inappropriate. The facts must be ana-
lyzed according to the letter and the spirit of section 2-313.
Section 2-313 does not directly address the situation in
which a buyer purchases knowing that a representation is false.
However, the subject of a buyer's advance knowledge of non-
conformity with a warranty is discussed in U.C.C. section 2-
316. This section states: "[W]hen the buyer before entering
the contract has examined the goods or the sample or model
as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there
is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an exami-
nation ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him."' 7'
67. Id.
68. U.C.C. § 2-313(2): "[Aln affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a
statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods
does not create a warranty."
69. U.C.C. § 2-313, Official Comment 4: "[Tihe parties . . . [may] make their
own bargain as they wish."
70. U.C.C. § 2-313, Official Comment 8.
71. See 1 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 492 (2d ed. 1970). A represen-
tation "cannot be regarded as having formed part of the basis of the bargain when the
buyer knew that it was not true." Id.
72. See City Machine & Mfg. Co. v. A. & A. Machine Corp., 4 U.C.C. Rptr. 461
(E.D.N.Y. 1967).
73. "[N]o particular reliance on such statements need be shown." U.C.C. § 2-
313, Official Comment 3.
74. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) (emphasis added).
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A reference to express warranty in section 2-316 would not have
been awkward or out of context, yet it is not mentioned. This
suggests that the drafters' intention was that express warran-
ties may exist regardless of the buyer's knowledge of a defect.
This is in accordance with the section 2-313 requirement
that a representation be a "part of the basis of the bargain."
7 5
This "part" may be a very significant or a very minor contribu-
tion to the commercial environment in which the bargain is
made, and the degree to which the buyer believes or is influ-
enced by a representation (reliance) is immaterial. The only
question is whether the representation may be fairly considered
a part of the commercial setting which is the foundation of the
sales contract. The focus is on the seller's representation.
There are many instances in which it would be fair to give
a buyer the protection of an express warranty, even though the
buyer did not believe at the time of purchase that the product
would conform to the seller's representation. For example,
words that describe the product may be of such a general na-
ture that a buyer is not certain about what sort of defects are
covered. A buyer may not agree at the time of purchase that a
product is in "good condition" as warranted."6 Minor defects
may be apparent that, in the buyer's opinion, indicate that the
product does not conform to the representation. However, the
buyer may purchase the product anyway on the belief that the
representation is insurance against the appearance of other de-
fects in the future, and that the product is a good deal in spite
of its minor deficiencies. It would be unfair and therefore con-
trary to section 2-31311 to deny the buyer the protection of an
express warranty when major defects become apparent because
of the buyer's subjective belief that the product with certain
minor defects is not in "good condition."
A second instance in which it would be proper to find an
express warranty is when non-conformity with a representation
is not apparent to a buyer while the product is still on the shelf.
Although the buyer does not believe at the time of purchase
that a product will perform as warranted, the product may be
the sort of item which makes it very difficult to know in ad-
75. U.C.C. § 2-313.
76. See generally Jansen v. Hook, 1 Ill. App. 3d 318, 272 N.E.2d 385 (1971), in
which a truck represented to be in "good condition" was inspected and test-driven by
the buyer before purchase. The court would not allow recovery because the buyer did
not initially believe that the truck was in good condition.
77. "The sole question is whether the language or samples or models are fairly
to be regarded as part of the contract." U.C.C. § 2-313, Official Comment 7.
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vance how well it will perform. An impatient buyer may be
persuaded to purchase against better judgment, believing that
it will be possible to return the item for exhange or refund if it
does not conform to the seller's representations. It would be
unfair to penalize the buyer who decides to give the seller the
benefit of the doubt.
These two examples are not exhaustive of the cases that
arise in which it is just to hold a seller bound by a representa-
tion that a buyer believes to be inaccurate. The U.C.C. pre-
sumes that a representation becomes part of the basis of a
bargain"8 because of its policy to hold a seller to what he has
agreed to sell, in all but the most unusual circumstances." This
presumption is not overcome by showing that a buyer has not
relied. However, a buyer will be denied recovery on the basis
of fairness if it appears that the purchase was not made in good
faith or that the parties explicity agreed that the particular
representation would not apply to their sales agreement. Com-
ment 4 states that the parties to a sales contract may "make
their own bargain as they wish. But in determining what they
have agreed upon good faith is a factor. . ... 80 Thus, a seller
will not be bound by an express warranty when it is clear that
a buyer, who was aware of the product's inadequacy, fully in-
tended at the time of purchase to return the product for refund
after enjoying its use for a period of time.
SECTION 2-313 AND OTHER PRODUCT THEORIES
Defining "part of the basis of the bargain" without reading
in a requirement of reliance does not create unnecessary over-
lap with other product and warranty theories. No other theory
covers the non-relying buyer who suffers only the economic loss
of purchasing a product that does not conform to an express
warranty but is not "unmerchantable." l Since the purpose of
section 2-313 is to determine what the seller agreed to sell, a
buyer is not denied the benefit of an express warranty because
he did not rely" or was not injured,' or because the product is
78. U.C.C. § 2-313, Official Comments 3, 7.
79. In view of the principle that the whole purpose of the law of warranty
is to determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell, the
policy is adopted of those cases which refuse except in unusual circum-
stances to recognize a material deletion of the seller's obligation.
U.C.C. § 2-313, Official Comment 4.
80. Id.
81. See U.C.C. § 2-314, which defines merchantability.
82. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 311, 402-B (1965); U.C.C. § 2-315.
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 311, 402-A, 402-B (1965).
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not fundamentally "unfit."84 These factors, which are required
elements of other theories of products liability, have nothing to
do with what a seller has offered for sale.
Even in cases in which other theories could protect the
buyer, as when a product is defective"8 or unmerchantable" and
when personal injury or property damage has resulted from the
inadequacy,87 a non-relying buyer can benefit from the applica-
bility of section 2-313. Establishing the existence of a defect or
of unmerchantability at a trial can be very costly and difficult.
Non-conformity with an express warranty is generally much
easier to show.M In such cases, application of section 2-313
would make proof under the other, more difficult theories un-
necessary because the inadequacy of the product would be con-
clusively established by the seller's own standard. Early settle-
ment of cases would be encouraged and lengthy trials avoided.
CONCLUSION
The words "part of the basis of the bargain" in U.C.C.
section 2-313 are intended to replace the Uniform Sales Act
requirement of reliance with a broader test that is not based
upon the attitude or conduct of the buyer but upon the repre-
sentation of the seller.
A seller creates an express warranty in two ways: (1) by
communication, directly to a buyer, of an affirmation of fact
or a promise regarding the goods; or (2) by communication, to
a class of persons of which the buyer is a member or directly
to a particular buyer, of a description, sample, or model of the
goods. Such representations constitute a part of the commer-
cial setting in which the goods are purchased and are, there-
fore, a part of the basis of any subsequent sale or bargain.
Reliance is strong evidence that a representation is "part of the
basis of the bargain," but is not a necessary element.
This formulation is not unfair to a seller. It merely encour-
ages honest dealing with the public. It is very fair to allow a
seller to be measured by a standard that he or she created.
84. See U.C.C. § 2-314.
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402-A (1965).
86. See U.C.C. § 2-314.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToaRs § 402-A (1965) applies only in cases involv-
ing personal injury or property damage.
88. See Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1975).
It would have been easier to show that the golfing gizmo was not "completely safe" as
warranted than to show that it was defective under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402-A, since a non-defective product is not necessarily completely safe.
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Liability cannot be avoided merely because a particular buyer
did not read a warranty.
Because fairness and good faith are built into the defini-
tion of express warranty under U.C.C. section 2-313, the seller
has no cause to fear that the section will sweep too broadly. The
circumstances of each case may be considered by a court to
prevent buyer abuse of express warranty benefits. Therefore,
the concept of reliance is not necessary to protect a seller from
unfair claims.
Kevin McIvers

